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Abstrat
The present paper oers a new approah to non-monotoni log-
is and their reonstrution in terms of inonsisteny-adaptive logis.
By applying a speial tehnique, universally quantied formulas are
assigned instanes that, given the paraonsistent framework, do not
ause triviality even if they onit with knowledge deriving from other
soures. From the speial instanes, the usual instanes may be derived
onditionally, viz. provided they are not ontradited by statements
derived with a higher preferene ranking.
1 Introdution
In this paper I present a new approah to non-monotoni reasoning. The
underlying idea is that universally quantied formulas (heneforth UQF) are
formulated unrestritedly, even if they have exeptions, but the derivation of
instanes is restrited, and derived instanes are not nally derivable (i.e. do
not belong to the onsequene set), when the instane is known to onern
an exeption to the UQF.
The eet is realized by reurring to an inonsisteny-adaptive logiHL2
that is based on a spei paraonsistent logi pHL2. Aording to pHL2,

I am indebted to the two referees; their remarks enabled me to improve the exposition
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e with problems onerning
default-reasoning and irumsription, has been very useful for me (see his [6℄). I am
espe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e in the
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a UQF (8)A() unonditionally entails :A() in whih \" is a paraon-
sistent negation and \:" lassial negation. Aording to HL2, :A() en-
tails A(), provided :A() `behaves onsistently' (in a sense speied later)
on the premises. I shall rst larify the role and the eets of paraonsistent
and inonsisteny-adaptive logis, and then motivate the transition to the
logis presented below.
Paraonsistent logis avoid that inonsistent theories are turned into
trivial ones. A straightforward strategy to obtain a paraonsistent logi
onsists in weakening lassial logi (CL) by dropping one half of the mean-
ing of negation, reduing it to \If A is false, then A is true". In [4℄ this
paraonsistent logi is alled CLuN.
1
CLuN indeed allows for non-trivial
inonsistent theories. It does so however by eliminating too many inferenes:
we want the intuitivily orret onsequenes to be derivable when no inon-
sisteny is involved; e.g. we want to apply Disjuntive Syllogism (A_B, A
/ B) whenever A does not behave inonsistently. The inonsisteny-adaptive
logis ACLuN1 and ACLuN2, based on CLuN, enable us to do so { see
[2℄, [3℄ and [4℄.
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In these logis some onsequenes whih are CL-derivable
but not CLuN-derivable, are ACLuN-derivable, provided ertain formulas
are reliable | that is: do not behave inonsistently in view of the premises.
Although inonsisteny-adaptive logis isolate inonsistenies and deliver
all lassial onsequenes whenever the spei inonsistenies do not pre-
vent this, they are not fully adequate with respet to everyday reasoning.
Indeed, in many situations we want to eliminate the inonsistenies as they
our. If an inonsisteny turns up, for instane within our most reliable
knowledge, we often wish to rejet one half of the inonsisteny and to retain
the other. The two kinds of inonsistenies onsidered in the present paper
are aused by the fat that we have dierent ways to obtain information
about the same statement. The information may stem from observation,
possibly ombined with logial dedution. It may also be derived from gen-
eral knowledge, for example from UQFs { and remark that a ombination
1
In [2℄ and [3℄ this paraonsistent logi was alled PIL. It was renamed in view of the
reation of analogous logis dealing with other abnormalities. The N stands for Negation,
the u stands for gluts. CLaN, for instane, is a paraomplete logi; here the a stands for
gaps.
CLuN is obtained from CL by dropping the axiom (A  B)  ((A B) A).
Classial negation, :, is introdued by :A =
df
A ?. Remark that neither Replaement
of Identials nor Replaement of Equivalents hold in the sope of a \". Also, CLuN
maximally isolates inonsistenies; from A&A, no other inonsisteny is derivable, not
even about subws or superws of A.
2
In [2℄ and [3℄, these logis were alled APIL1 and APIL2.
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of UQFs may lead to oniting information. In view of the elegane and
power of our most reliable knowledge, we are interested in general state-
ments without exeptions. If onits arise, we want to rejet the instane
of the general statement and to retain the more spei information (i.e.
the observational information or the information derived from more spei
UQFs).
In the seond part of this paper I introdue Hypothesis Logi HL. This
adaptive logi is based on pHL, whih is obtained from CL by modifying its
instantiation rule: from (8)A(), :A() is derived instead of A(). The
url is the paraonsistent negation as dened in CLuN. As an immediate
result, the inonsisteny arising if :A() is provided by information deriving
from a dierent soure, does not ause explosion. Aording to HL, A()
is only derivable from :A() provided :A() is not derivable from the
available premises. The modiation has a further and most interesting
eet: if an exeption turns out to be derivable after the instane A()
was onditionally derived, the onditionally derived instane will not be
onsidered as nally derivable beause the line in whih it ours is marked
in view of a stritly logial marking rule. The advantage of suh a marking
rule is lear: when inonsistenies are weeded out within a proof, we obtain
a riher (but not trivial) and (in as far as we eshew inonsistenies) more
interesting onsequene set, and we do so by stritly formal means.
In the third part of the paper I introdue HL1, a logi pertaining to
languages that ombine the universal quantier of HL with the one of CL.
Unlike HL, HL1 enables us also to resolve inonsistenies deriving from
UQFs. The idea is that `lassial' UQFs an be instantiated unonditionally,
while the others an only be onditionally instantiated. In order to apply
HL1, we need to lassify (from the very outset) UQFs in lassial and
`exeptional' ones | this elimination of inonsistenies is not stritly logial
but relies on non-logial onsiderations.
In the nal part I introdue HL2, whih generalizes the idea of sorted
quantiers. Where HL1 ontains one kind of exeptional universal quan-
tier, HL2 ontains a preferentially ordered (indenitely large) amount of
them. For simpliity's sake, I shall only onsider linear orderings. The
preferene of a UQF will be indiated by a number supersripted to the
universal quantier, lower numbers indiating the higher preferenes (for
the sake of generality, lassial UQFs will reeive the supersript 0). The
relation between a HL2-UQF of preferene i and a HL2-UQF of preferene
i+ j (j  1), is the same as the relation between a lassial HL1-UQF and
an exeptional HL1-UQF. Where a ontradition arises between (a formula
3
derived from) an instane of a UQF of preferene i and (a formula derived
from) an instane of a UQF of preferene i+ j, it will follow from the our-
rene of the former that the line in whih the latter ours is marked, and
hene the latter will not be nally derivable.
2 HL.
In HL all UQFs may have exeptions. This implies that the CL-instanes
are derivable onditionally. Where no exeption ours, the onditions are
not overruled and the HL-instanes are the CL-instanes.
All negations ourring in natural languages are formalized by means
of \:", the lassial negation, but the language sheme of HL ontains a
seond, paraonsistent negation \". The universal instantiation rule ofHL
is:
3
ui: (8)A() / :A()
The instane an be read as: there is no reason to aept (= \") that
A() is not the ase (= \:"). An immediate advantage of this instan-
tiantion rule is that no (lassial) inonsisteny ours when :A() is also
derivable from the premises. In the underlying paraonsistent logi pHL
it is impossible to derive A from :A; in HL, the adaptive logi based on
it, A an be derived from :A onditionally. All pHL-onsequenes are
HL-onsequenes. Some CL-onsequenes whih are not pHL-derivable,
are HL-derivable. An example of a HL-proof:
(1) (8x)(Ax  (Px&:Qx)) - prem -
(2) Ba  Qa - prem -
(3) Aa - prem -
(4) Ba - prem -
(5) :(Aa  (Pa&:Qa)) 1 ui -
(6) Aa  (Pa&:Qa) 5 dn
4
:(Aa  (Pa&:Qa))
(7) Pa&:Qa 3, 6 mp :(Aa  (Pa&:Qa))
(8) :Qa 7 sim :(Aa  (Pa&:Qa))
(9) Qa 2, 4 mp -
3
In this paper the proof theory is formulated axiomatially. In atual proofs however
it is handier to make use of Fith-style rules. I skip the proofs of the derivation of the
Fith-style rules from the axioms. (These proofs are standard.) Where neessary the
applied Fith-style rules are explained in a footnote.
4
dn stands for onditional double negation. This rule is explained in Setion 2.2.1.
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The formula in line (6) is derived on ondition of the -onsistent be-
haviour of the formula in the fth element of line (6). Every formula derived
from a onditionally derived formula takes over the ondition(s). If we stop
the proof at line (9), we have derived both Qa and :Qa, whih is not exatly
what we want; as Qa is derived from more spei information than :Qa,
we want only Qa to be nally derivable. If we ontinue the proof, we nd
out that the ondition mentioned in lines (6)-(8) is overruled.
(10) ::Qa 9 dn -
(11) :Pa _ ::Qa 10 add -
(12) :(Pa&:Qa) 11 nd -
(13) :(Aa  (Pa&:Qa)) 3, 12 ni
5
-
As both :(Aa  (Pa&:Qa)) (line (13)) and its negation (line (5)) are
derived unonditionally, the ondition in lines (6)-(8) is overruled, and there-
fore the formulas in these lines will not be onsidered as nally derivable, i.e.
Qa belongs to the onsequene set of the premises (Cn
HL
(fpremisesg))
6
,
while :Qa does not. The inonsisteny is resolved. I will introdue a de-
rived marking rule by whih line (8) an be marked without extending the
proof with lines (9)-(13). In what follows lines of a proof that ontain an
overruled ondition in their fth element, will be marked with y, e.g. lines
(6)-(8) in the proof above. Marked lines do not belong to the proof anymore.
Formulas in the seond element of marked lines are not HL-onsequenes.
The notation \℄A" will be the short for \A&A".
2.1 The underlying paraonsistent logi pHL.
2.1.1 Proof Theory of pHL.
The axiom sheme of pHL is omposed of a suitable set of axioms for ,
&, _, , ?, :, 9 and =
7
(as for CL), together with:
5
ni stands for negation of the impliation. In view of the fat that A  B is true i A
is not true (or :A is true) or B is true, :(A  B) is true i A is true and B is not true
(or :B is true).
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Where XL is a logi, and   is a set of well formed formulas, Cn
XL
( ) = fA j   `
XL
Ag.
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Replaement of identials is restrited as follows:
(A=2)  =   (A  B) where B is obtained by replaing in A an ourrene of 
that ours outside the sope of a  by .
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A8: (8)A() :A()
R8: To derive ` A  (8)B() from ` A :B(),
provided  does not our in either A or B()
A: A_ A
Replaement of equivalents and replaement of identials is restrited to
subformulas outside the sope of . As A `
pHL
:A, the usual R8 rule of
CL is derivable. Remark that (A& A)  B is not a pHL-theorem. In
view of the axiom sheme, A is not pHL-derivable from :A, and A() is
not derivable from (8)A(). All CL-theorems onerning , &, _, , ?,
and : are valid in pHL.
The-paraonsistent logi pHL provides us with the rst property every
logi for general statements that might have exeptions should have: the
ourrene of an exeption does not ause triviality. In HL, the adaptive
logi based on pHL, A() will be derivable from (8)A() whenever :A()
is not derivable. The following theorems show that usual CL-onsequenes
are derivable in pHL in disjuntion with a -inonsisteny.
Theorem 1 If   `
pHL
:A, then   `
pHL
℄:A _A.
Proof. As :A _A is a pHL-theorem, :A `
pHL
℄:A _A. 2.
Theorem 2 If   `
pHL
A  B and   `
pHL
:A, then   `
pHL
℄:A _B.
Proof. The proof follows immediately from Theorem 1 and A  B, C _A
`
pHL
C _B. 2.
2.1.2 Semantis of pHL.
Let S be the set of sentential letters, P
n
the set of prediative letters of
rank n, C and V the set of letters for individual onstants and variables
respetively, F the set of (open and losed) formulas, W the set of well
formed formulas (ws), and N = fA j A 2 Fg. Let the members of C as
well as the members of V be given in a ertain order denoted by \<". The
following ws will be alled primitive: members of S, formulas of the form
 = , and primitive prediative formulas.
A model is a oupleM = hD; vi in whih D is a set and v is an assignment-
funtion dened by:
S1.1 v: S  ! f0; 1g
S1.2 v: C [ V  ! D suh that D = fv() j  2 C [ Vg
S1.3 v: P
n
 ! P(D
n
) (the power set of the n-th Cartesian produt of D)
S1.4 v: N  ! f0; 1g
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The valuation-funtion v
M
determined by the model M is dened as
follows:
S2.1 v
M
: F  ! f0; 1g
S2.2 where A 2 S, v
M
(A) = v(A)
S2.3 v
M
(
n

1
:::
n
) = 1 i hv(
1
); :::v(
n
)i 2 v(
n
)
S2.4 v
M
( = ) = 1 i v() = v()
S2.5 v
M
(:A) = 1 i v
M
(A) = 0
S2.6 v
M
(A) = 1 i v
M
(A) = 0 or v(A) = 1
S2.7 v
M
(A  B) = 1 i v
M
(A) = 0 or v
M
(B) = 1
S2.8 v
M
(A&B) = 1 i v
M
(A) = 1 and v
M
(B) = 1
S2.9 v
M
(A _B) = 1 i v
M
(A) = 1 or v
M
(B) = 1
S2.10 v
M
(A  B) = 1 i v
M
(A) = v
M
(B)
S2.11 v
M
((8)A()) = 1 i v
M
(:A()) = 1 for all  2 C [ V
S2.12 v
M
((9)A()) = 1 i v
M
(A()) = 1 for at least one  2 C [ V
Definition:   j=
pHL
A i, for any pHL-model M, v
M
(B) = 0, for some
B 2   or v
M
(A) = 1.
Definition: A pHL-model is N -normal i v(A) = 0 for all A 2 F .
Definition: Two models (even from dierent types of semantis) are equiv-
alent i they verify and falsify the same formulas.
The CL-models are these pHL-models that full:
(1) v
M
(A) = 1 i v
M
(A) = 0.
(2) v
M
((8)A()) = 1 i v
M
(A()) = 1 for all  2 C [ V.
In view of (1), v
M
(A) = v
M
(:A) in all CL-models M.
Theorem 3 Any pHL-model that is equivalent to a N -normal model, is
equivalent to a CL-model, and any CL-model is equivalent to a N -normal
model.
Proof. If M is N -normal, then v(A) = 0, and hene, in view of S2.6,
(1) is fullled. Hene  is exatly the same as :, and an be replaed by
it. Therefore, in view of S2.11 and v
M
(::A) = v
M
(A), (2) is fullled too.
All other CL-lauses are the same as the orresponding pHL-lauses. This
shows that any N -normal model is equivalent to a CL-model. Conversely,
any CL-model is transformed into an equivalent N -normal model by adding
lause S1.4 and stipulating that v(A) = 0 for all A 2 F , and by adding
lause S2.6. 2
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2.1.3 Metatheory of pHL.
In view of Theorem 3, CL is modelled by the set of pHL-models that
are equivalent to N -normal -models, in other words, by -onsistent pHL-
models (those in whih v
M
(A) = v
M
(:A) for any A 2 F).
Theorem 4 If   `
pHL
A, then   j=
pHL
A.
(Proof left to reader.)
Theorem 5 If   j=
pHL
A, then   `
pHL
A.
Proof. Let   j=
pHL
A and suppose   6`
pHL
A. We dene a maximally
non-trivial, dedutively losed superset  ( W) of   suh that A 62 , and
show that  denes a pHL-model of  . Let B
1
; B
2
; ::: be an enumeration
of the members of W in whih every w of the form (9)C() is followed
immediately by C(
i
), where 
i
does not our in  , A, or in any previous
w of the enumeration. The way to obtain suh enumeration is standard.
We dene

0
= Cn
pHL
( )

i+1
= Cn
pHL
(
1
[ fB
i+1
g) if A 62 Cn
pHL
(
1
[ fB
i+1
g)

i+1
= 
i
otherwise
 = 
0
[
1
[ :::
It is easily seen that    , that A 62 , and that  is dedutively losed.
 is maximally non-trivial. To see this, remark rst that A  C 2  for all
C. Indeed, if A  C 62 , there is a 
i
suh that  [ fA  Cg `
pHL
A;
hene 
i
`
pHL
(A  C)  A by the dedution theorem; hene in view of
the axiom ((A  B)  A)  A, 
i
`
pHL
A, whih is impossible. If E 62 ,
then there is a 
i
suh that 
i
[ fEg `
pHL
A; as A  C 2  for all C,
 [ fEg is trivial.
We dene a pHL-model M = hD; vi as follows:
(1) D = f j  2 C (and there is no  2 C suh that  <  and  =  2 g,
(2) for all C 2 S, v(C) = 1 i C 2 ,
(3) for all  2 C, if  2 D, v() = , if  2 C   D, v() is the  2 D suh
that  =  2  (there is a unique suh  by the denition of D),
(4) for all  2 P
n
, v() = fh
1
; :::; 
n
i j 
1
:::
n
2 g,
(5) for all C 2 N , v(C) = 1 i C;C 2 ,
(6) eah  2 V is arbitrarily assoiated with a onstant  to the eet that
v() = v() and, for any A, v(A()) = v(A()).
8
Obviously (1)-(5) agree with the lauses S1.1-4 that dene v in the pHL-
semantis.
In order to prove that M veries   and falsies A, we show that, for all
C 2 W:
(*) if C 2 , then v
M
(C) = 1.
This proeeds by indution on the omplexity of C. For the basis, we show
that (*) holds for all primitive ws. This is obvious for members of S in
view of (2) and S2.2.
Consider the primitive prediative w 
1
:::
n
. If 
1
:::
n
2 , then
v
M
(
1
:::
n
) = 1 in view of (3), (4) and S2.3. Hene (*) holds for primitive
prediative expressions.
Consider, nally, ws of the form  = . If  =  2 , then by the
denition of D, there is a  2 D suh that  = ;  =  2 ; hene
v() = v() =  and v
M
( = ) = 1.
We now proeed to the indution step. All steps are standard exept
for negation and the universal quantier. If C 2 , then either C 2  or
C 62 . If C 2  then v(C) = 1 (by (5)); if C 62 , then v
M
(C) = 0 by the
indution hypothesis. In view of S2.6, either ase implies that v
M
(C) = 1.
If (8)C() 2 , then :C() 2  for all  2 C and hene v
M
(:C()) =
1 for all  2 C; in view of (6), v
M
() = 1 for all  2 V. Hene, by S2.11,
v
M
((8)C()) = 1.
As  is maximally non-trivial and v
M
(C) = 1 for all C 2 , it follows
immediately that  = fC j v
M
(C) = 1g and hene that v
M
(A) = 0. but
v
M
(B) = 1 for all B 2  . Hene   6j=
pHL
A. 2.
2.2 HL.
HL has two purposes. (i) Whenever :A is pHL-derivable and :A is not
pHL-derivable from  , then A is HL-derivable. (ii) If both :A and :A
are pHL-derivable, then :A is HL-derivable but A is not.
8
2.2.1 Proof Theory of HL.
Where ℄A is a formula in whih the variables 
1
; :::; 
m
(m  0) our free,
let 9℄A be (9
1
):::(9
m
)℄A. Let DEKfA
1
; :::; A
n
g refer to 9℄A
1
_ :::_ 9℄A
n
,
a disjuntion of (where neessary) existentially quantied ontraditions.
A
1
; :::; A
n
are the fators of DEKfA
1
; :::; A
n
g.
8
There are dierent strategies to onstrut an adaptive logi. The strategy followed
here is the same as the strategy on whih ACLuN1 is based, namely reliability. See [4℄.
Remark that DEK([ fPxg) is pHL-equivalent to DEK([fPyg) and
pHL-derivable from DEK( [ fPag).
Obviously, for any N -normal model M, v
M
(9℄A) = 0.
Theorem 6 If there are C
1
; :::; C
n
2 F (0  n) suh that   j=
pHL
DEKfC
1
; :::; C
n
g _A, then   j=
CL
A.
Proof. It follows from the anteedent that any pHL-modelM veries 9℄C
1
or ... or 9℄C
n
or A. Any CL-model is equivalent to a N -normal model. But
these models all falsify any 9℄C
i
. Hene any CL-model veries A. 2
Dene the set bsf(A) of (open and losed) basi subformulas of A as
follows:
(i) if A is a primitive (open or losed) formula, then bsf(A) = fAg,
(ii) bsf(:B) = bsf(B),
(iii) bsf(B) = fBg [ bsf(B),
(iv) bsf(B _ C) = bsf(B  C) = bsf(B&C) = bsf(B  C) = bsf(B) [ bsf(C),
(v) bsf((8)A()) = bsf(:A()),
(vi) bsf((9)A()) = bsf(A()).
bsf(A) is nite for any A.
Lemma 1 For any pHL-model M, if there is no B suh that B 2 bsf(A)
and v
M
(9℄B) = 1, then there is a N -normal model M' suh that v
M
(A) =
v
M
0
(A).
Proof. Suppose the anteedent is true for some M. Let M
0
be obtained
from M by putting v(B) = 0 for all B (m). We proeed by an indution
on the omplexity of A (the number of quantiers and onnetives that
our in A). If the omplexity of A is 0, then v
M
0
(A) = v
M
(A). Supposing
that v
M
0
(A) = v
M
(A) for all A with omplexity less than n, I show that
v
M
0
(A) = v
M
(A) for all A with omplexity n. Of the eight ases to be
onsidered, ve are obvious, viz. the ones where A is either :B or B  C
or B&C or B _ C or B  C.
Case 6: A is B. If v
M
0
(B) = v
M
(B) = 0, then v
M
0
(B) = v
M
(B) = 1
by S2.6. Suppose that v
M
0
(B) = v
M
(B) = 1. Then v
M
0
(B) = 0 (as M
0
is
a N -normal model). But also v
M
(B) = 0, for otherwise, in view of S2.6,
v(B) = v
M
(℄B) = v
M
(9℄B) = 1, whih ontradits the main supposition.
Case 7: A is (9)B(). Suppose rst that v
M
(A) = 1. Then v
M
(B()) =
1 for at least one  2 C[V. Hene, by the indution hypothesis, v
M
0
(B()) =
1 for at least one  2 C[V. But then v
M
0
((9)B()) = 1. Suppose next that
10
vM
(A) = 0. Then v
M
(B()) = 0 for all  2 C [ V. Hene, by the indution
hypothesis, v
M
0
(B()) = 0 for all  2 C [ V. But then v
M
0
((9)B()) = 0.
Case 8: A is (8)B(). Suppose rst that v
M
(A)= 1. Then v
M
(:B())
= 1 for all  2 C [ V (k). As bsf(:B()) = bsf(A) (by (v)), :B() 2
bsf(A). But then v
M
(9℄:B()) = 0 and hene v
M
(:B()) = 0 for all  2
C[V (in view of (k)). But then, by the indution hypothesis, v
M
0
(:B()) =
0 for all  2 O, and hene v
M
0
(:B()) = 1 for all  2 C [ V. But
then v
M
0
((8)B()) = 1. Suppose next that v
M
(A) = 0. Then there is a
 2 C [V suh that v
M
(:B()) = 0. Then v
M
(:B()) = 1 for at least one
 2 C [ V, and hene, by the indution hypothesis, v
M
0
(:B()) = 1 for the
same  2 C [V. But then in view of (m) and S2.6, v
M
0
(:B()) = 0 for at
least one  2 C [ V, and hene v
M
0
((8)B()) = 0. 2.
Theorem 7 If j=
CL
A, then for some C
1
; :::; C
n
2 F (0  n), j=
pHL
DEKfC
1
; :::; C
n
g _A.
Proof. Let j=
CL
A. Hene v
M
(A) = 1 for all N -normal models M of  .
As bsf(A) is nite, DEKfB jB 2 bsf(A)g _ A is a w, whih is easily
shown to be pHL-valid. Consider indeed a pHL-model M. If, for some
B 2 bsf(A)v
M
(9℄B) = 1, then v
M
(DEKfB jB 2 bsf(A)g) = 1. If, for no
B 2 bsf(A), v
M
(9℄B) = 1, then v
M
(A) = 1 by Lemma 1. 2.
Some formulas in the seond olumnHL-proofs are derived onditionally,
and the lines in whih they our, have to be marked when a ondition is
overruled. Formulas in the seond element of marked lines do not belong to
the onsequene set. Conditions are all of one kind: some C
1
; :::; C
n
have to
behave -onsistently.
The idea of the proof theory of HL is that we apply all rules derivable
in pHL unonditionally, whereas other rules derivable in CL are applied on
ondition that ertain formulas are reliable with respet to their onsistent
behaviour. To keep the matter algorithmi, the onsistent behaviour of
a formula will be determined by the stage of the proof instead of by the
abstrat notion of derivability. As a result, formulas derived at some stage
of proof, will not be nally derivable, beause the line in whih they our
will be marked at a later stage. Of ourse eah set of premises must (and
will) have a unique set of nal HL-onsequenes.
As shown in the example above, HL-proofs are written in a speial
format aording to whih eah line of a proof onsist of ve elements:
(i) a line number,
(ii) a premise, a theorem or a derived formula,
(iii) the line numbers of the ws from whih (ii) is derived,
11
(iv) the rule of inferene that justies the derivation, and
(v) the formulas on the onsistent behaviour of whih we rely in order
for (ii) to be derivable by (iv) from the formulas of the lines enumerated
in (iii).
Definition. A ours unonditionally at some line of a proof i the fth
element of that line is empty.
Definition. A behaves onsistently at a stage of a proof i ℄A does not
our unonditionally in the proof at that stage.
Definition. The onsistent behaviour of A
1
is onneted to the onsistent
behaviour of A
2
; :::; A
n
at a stage of a proof i DEKfA
1
; :::; A
n
g ours
unonditionally in the proof at that stage whereas DEKfA
2
; :::; A
n
g does
not our unonditionally in it.
Definition. A is reliable at a stage of a proof i A behaves onsistently
at that stage and its onsistent behaviour is not onneted to the onsistent
behaviour of other formulas.
Given these denitions, proofs in HL are governed by an unonditional
rule, a onditional rule and a marking rule. The appliation of a rule to a
proof at a stage produes the next stage.
RU If `
pHL
(A
1
&:::&A
n
)  B, and A
1
; :::; A
n
our in the proof,
then add B to it. The fth element of the new line is the
union of the fth elements of the lines mentioned in its third
element.
RC If `
pHL
DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g _ ((A
1
&:::&A
n
)  B), and A
1
; :::;
A
n
our in the proof, then add B to it, provided that eah
fator of DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g is reliable at that stage. The fth
element of the new line is the union of fC
1
; :::; C
m
g and of
the fth elements of the lines mentioned in its third element.
RM If C is not (any more) reliable, then mark all lines the fth
element of whih ontains C, by writing \y" before the line
number. A marked line does not belong to the proof at that
stage.
9
At any stage of the proof, it is obligatory to apply RM and permitted
to apply RU and RC. If the fth element of a line is empty, the formula
in its seond element is pHL-derivable from the premises and annot be
marked later. If the fth element is not empty, its formula is provisionally
derived. Unless it an also be derived at a line the fth element of whih
9
At every stage of a proof, previously introdued marks are omitted, and marks are
introdued aording to the reliability at the new stage.
12
is empty, it is not a pHL-onsequene. The unonditional ourrene of
DEK-formulas in the proof determines whether some formulas are reliable,
and hene whih appliations of RC are permitted in view of pHL-formulas
of the form DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g _ ((A
1
&:::&A
n
)  B). As usual proofs may
be sped up by derived rules. Of ourse all positive rules of CL are valid
unonditionally. Raa, Redutio ad absurdum in the ase of \:", (A  B,
A  :B / :A) annot be applied if the fth element of the premise lines is
not empty.
10
ObviouslyR8 (to derive ` A  (8)B() from ` A :B(),
provided  does not our in either A or B()) annot be applied if  :B()
is the seond element of a line the fth element of whih ontains a formula
in whih  ours. I list some spei HL-rules. The mentioned sets refer
to the fth element of the line.
- Negation Rules:
nr: :A,  / A, 
nr: A,  / :A,  [ fAg
ui: Instane of a Universal Quantiation:
(8)A(), / :A(), 
dn: Double Negation:
A,  / :A, 
:A,  / A, 
dn: Conditional Double Negation:
:A, /A,  [ f:Ag
A, /A,  [ fAg
A, /:A,  [ fAg
HL has a dynami proof proedure: a w may be derived at some stage
of a proof, while the line in whih it ours may be marked at a later stage
of the proof; and a formula that is not reliable at some stage (whih results
in the marking of all lines with this formula in their fth element), may
beome reliable at a later stage. Therefore we need to distinguish between
provisional and nal onsequenes.
Definition. A is nally derived at some line in an HL-proof i (i) it is
the seond element of that line and (ii) where fC
1
; :::; C
n
g (n  0) is the
fth element of the line, any extension of the proof an be further extended
in suh way that it ontains a line that has A as its seond element and
fC
1
; :::; C
n
g as its fth element.
10
The reason is obvious. Suppose A  B is derived in a line of whih the fth element
is C. This means that ℄C _ (A  B) (and not A  B) is pHL-derived (see Lemma 2,
below); it is lear that the simultanous ourrene of ℄C _ (A  B) and A  :B does not
mean that the ourrene of A leads to triviality.
13
Sometimes a C
i
is unreliable in an extension of the proof (in that its on-
sistent behaviour beomes onneted to that of other formulas). However, if
any extension an be further extended in suh way that all C
i
are reliable,
then A is derived from   on the ondition fC
1
; :::; C
n
g in an absolute sense
(whih is studied further below).
Definition.   `
HL
A (A is nally HL-derivable from  ), i A is nally
derived at some line in a HL-proof from  .
Definition. (The HL-onsequene set of  ) Cn
HL
( ) = fA j   `
HL
Ag.
pHL is not deidable. We lak a positive test for HL-derivability. Of
ourse, some fragments of HL are deidable.
Yet, it is possible to prove that Cn
HL
( ) may be haraterized without
referring to the dynamis of the proofs. The haraterization refers to pHL
only. The entral point is that it depends only on pHL-derivability (whih is
monotoni) whether a w is reliable in an intelligent extension of the proof.
Lemma 2 If in an HL-proof from  , A ours as the seond element and
fC
1
; :::; C
m
g (0  m) ours as the fth element of a line, then   `
pHL
A _ DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g.
11
In view of this lemma, we an introdue the following derivation rule.
Dek: A,  / A _DEK()
Definition. A DEK-onsequene of   is a DEK-formula whih is pHL-
derivable from  .
Definition. DEK() is a minimal DEK-onsequene of   i it is a DEK-
onsequene of  , and for no   , DEK() is a DEK-onsequene of
 .
Theorem 8   `
HL
A, i there are C
1
; :::; C
m
2 F (0  m) suh that
  `
pHL
A_DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g, and none of C
1
; :::; C
m
is a fator of a minimal
DEK-onsequene of  .
12
It follows from Theorem 8 that whenever A ours as the seond element of
a line of a HL-proof in whih C
1
; :::; C
m
is the fth element, a new line an
be added with A _ DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g as seond element and an empty fth
element, and vie versa.
The following Theorem expresses an important feature of HL:
11
The proof of Lemma 2 is ompletely analogous to the proof of Lemma 1 in [1℄ and
Lemma 4.2 in [4℄.
12
The proof of Theorem 8 is ompletely analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.3 in [4℄.
14
Theorem 9 If   `
HL
A, then it is possible to extend any proof from   into
a proof in whih A is nally derived from  .
13
I now give a derivable marking rule in HL.
mr1: If A (resp. :A) is onditionally derived at line i of a HL-
proof from  , while :A (resp. A) is derived unonditionally
at any line of the proof, then mark line i.
Theorem 10 The marking rule mr1 is derivable in HL.
Proof. By assumption, A ours in a HL-proof from   as the seond
element of a line (i) the fth element of whih is C
1
; :::; C
n
(1  n). By
Lemma 2, DEKfC
1
; :::; C
n
g _ A is a pHL-onsequene of  , and hene an
be derived unonditionally in the HL-proof. Suppose :A ours at line (j)
with an empty fth element. In view of the pHL-theorem A _ :A, also
DEKfC
1
; :::; C
n
g is unonditionally derivable. But then at least one of its
fators is unreliable and hene all lines with eah of the formulas C
1
; ::: or
C
n
in their fth element have to be marked, in view of RM. The proof is
ompletely analogous if we replae A by :A and vie versa. 2.
2.2.2 Semantis of HL
TheHL-semantis is obtained from the pHL-semantis by dening, for eah
 , a subset of the pHL-models of  . The idea is that any   denes a set of
(semantially) unreliable formulas, and that the HL-models of   are those
pHL-models of   in whih only unreliable formulas behave inonsistently.
Definition. A is HL-unreliable with respet to   i A is a fator of a
minimal DEK-onsequene of  . U( ) is the set of all ws that are HL-
unreliable with respet to  .
Definition: Where M is a pHL-model, ab(M) = fA j v
M
(℄A) = 1g.
Definition: M is a HL-model of   i it is a pHL-model of   and ab(M) 
U( ).
Definition:   j=
HL
A i A is true in all HL-models of  .
2.2.3 Metatheory of HL.
Theorem 11 If   `
HL
A, then   j=
HL
A.
Proof. Let   `
HL
A. By Theorem 8, there are C
1
; :::; C
m
(m  0) suh that
  `
pHL
A _ DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g, and C
1
; :::; C
m
62 U( ). If   j=
pHL
A, then
13
The proof of Theorem 9 is ompletely analogous to the proof of Theorem 4.4 in [4℄.
15
  j=
HL
A (all HL-models are pHL-models). If there are C
1
; :::; C
m
(m  1)
suh that   `
pHL
A_DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g, and C
1
; :::; C
m
62 U( ), then, for all
HL-modelsM of  , v
M
(A_DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g) = 1, and v
M
(DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g)
= 0, and hene v
M
(A) = 1. 2.
Theorem 12 If   j=
HL
A, then   `
HL
A.
Proof. Suppose that   j=
HL
A and   6`
HL
A. Let the sequene B
1
; B
2
; :::
be dened as in the proof of Theorem 5. We dene

0
= Cn
pHL
(  [ fDEKfBg  A j B 2 W   U( )g).
14

i+1
= Cn
pHL
(
1
[ fB
i+1
g) if A 62 Cn
pHL
(
1
[ fB
i+1
g), and

i+1
= 
i
otherwise
 = 
0
[
1
[ :::
Eah of the following is provable:
(i)    
(ii) A 62 . By the denition of , if A 2 , then A 2 
0
. The
latter however is impossible. Indeed, if A 2 
0
, then there are C
1
; :::; C
m
2
F  U( ) (m  1) suh that  [ fDEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g  Ag `
pHL
A.
15
Hene,
by the dedution theorem,   `
pHL
(DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g  A)  A; hene
  `
pHL
DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g _ A. But as C
1
; :::; C
m
2 F   U( ), it follows by
Theorem8 that   `
HL
A, whih ontradits (the main supposition.
(iii) If C 62 U( ), then 9℄C 62 . Indeed, if C 62 U( ), then ℄C  A 2

0
; so if ℄C 2 , then A 2 , whih ontradits (ii).
(iv)  is dedutively losed (by the denition of ).
(v)  is maximally non-trivial (as in the proof of Theorem 5.
As in the proof of Theorem 5, a pHL-model M is a HL-model is dened
from . In view of (i) and (ii), all members of   are true in M and A is false
in M. In view of (iii), M is a HL-model of  . Hene   6`
HL
A. 2.
3 HL1.
The proof theory and the semantis of HL1 are obtained by adding the
CL-lauses onerning the universal quantier to the proof theory and the
14
It is in view of the fat that U( ) is denied by means of the semantial notion minimal
DEK-onsequenes, that the onstrution of  aptures the dynami proof proedure.
Remember that in Theorem 8   `
HL
A is dened without referring to the dynamis of
HL-proofs.
15
In view of the fat that any pHL-proof is nite, and of fA  B;C  Bg `
pHL
(A _ C)  B.
16
semantis ofHL. We write theCL-quantier as \8
0
", and theHL-quantier
as \8". The metatheory of pHL1 andHL1 is ompletely analogous to those
of pHL and HL. An example of a HL1-proof will show the usefulness of
HL1.
16
(1) (8x)(Bx  Fx) - prem-
(2) (8
0
x)(Px  Bx) - prem-
(3) (8
0
x)(Px  :Fx) - prem-
(4) Pa - prem-
(5) Bb - prem-
(6) :(Ba  Fa) 1 ui -
(7) Ba  Fa 6 dn :(Ba  Fa)
(8) Pa  Ba 2 ui
0
-
(9) Ba 4, 8 mp -
y(10) Fa 7, 9 mp :(Ba  Fa)
(11) Pa  :Fa 3 ui
0
-
(12) :Fa 4, 11 mp -
(13) :(Bb  Fb) 1 ui -
(14) Bb  Fb 13 dn :(Bb  Fb)
(15) Fb 5, 14 mp :(Bb  Fb)
In view of mr1 line (10) has to be marked, and hene :Fa is nally
derived while Fa is not.
17
As the ondition in line (15) is not overruled (it
is not possible to derive ℄:(Bb  Fb)), Fb is nally derived.
If we onstrut now a proof from the premises (8x)(Px  :Fx),
(8
0
x)(Mx  Px), (8
0
x)(Mx  Fx), M and Pa, we an derive F and
:Fa (in a ompletely analogous way as in the former proof).
Suppose now we want to make one proof from these two proofs. Then
we meet a problem in that we have both (8
0
x)(Px  :Fx) and (8x)(Px 
:Fx). A UQF annot be lassial and exeptional at one. If we make it
a lassial UQF, then we an derive an inonsisteny that auses triviality
from the premises: both F and :F are derivable unonditionally. Hene,
it has to be onsidered as a UQF that might have exeptions; but if we make
it an exeptional UQF, :Fa is only derivable on unreliable onditions, and
hene neither :Fa nor Fa are nally derivable.
16
In the proofs given as example in Setions 3 and 4, you an read \B" as \is a bird",
\P" as \is a penguin", \M" as \is a motorized penguin", and \F" as \an y".
17
It is easily seen that ℄:(Ba  Fa) an be derived unonditionally. One this is done,
line (7) has to be marked, in view of RM.
17
This example shows that the HL1-formalization of rules allows us to
derive nally more wanted onsequenes than the HL-formalization. But
some wanted onsequenes are not nally derivable, espeially if the on-
text of appliation extends in suh a way that general statements without
exeptions beome general statements that might have exeptions. In HL2
however only the unwanted onsequenes will not be nally derivable.
4 HL2.
HL2 is obtained by introduing a preferene ordering on the exeptional
UQFs of HL1. Instead of one set of exeptional UQFs, there is a set of
UQFs of preferene 1 (the highest preferene), ..., and a set UQFs of pref-
erene n (the lowest preferene). With UQFs of preferene n orrespond
instanes of preferene n (notation: 
n
:A).
18
If i < j, the relation between
a HL2-UQF of preferene i and a HL2-UQF of preferene j, is the same as
the relation between the orresponding lassial HL1-UQF and the orre-
sponding exeptional HL1-UQF. An immediate result is that, in ase of a
ontradition between (a formula derived from) an instane of preferene i
and (a formula derived from) an instane of preferene j, it will follow from
the ourrene of the former that the latter is not nally derivable.
I am not dealing here with the question whih UQFs have to be related
to a higher or lower preferene.
19
In spei ontexts however, preferenes
an often be asribed without problems. In the example of Setion 3, for
instane, the premises will ontain the following UQFs: (8
0
x)(Px  Bx)
and (8
0
x)(Mx  Px), (8
1
x)(Mx  Fx), (8
2
x)(Px  :Fx) and (8
3
x)(Bx 
Fx). In this setion it will beome lear that F, :Fa and Fb are nally
derivable from these premises.
4.1 The Underlying Paraonsistent Logi pHL2.
4.1.1 Proof Theory of pHL2.
The underlying paraonsistent logi of HL2, is pHL2, whih is obtained
from pHL1 by introduing preferenes in the language sheme: there are n
exeptional universal quantiers: 8
1
; :::;8
n
, and n paraonsistent negations:

1
; :::;
n
. The axiom sheme is obtained by replaing in pHL1 A8, R8
and A by: (for all n  1)
18

n
:A an be read as \we give preferene n to the fat that there is no reason to rejet
A.
19
For an extended study on preferenes, I refer to, e.g., [7℄.
18
A8
n
: (8
n
)A() 
n
:A()
R8
n
: To derive ` A  (8
n
)B() from A 
n
:B(),
provided  does not our in either A or B()
A
n
: A_
n
A
The Fith-style rule Universal Instantiation from a UQF with preferene
n ( 1) is indiated as \ui
n
".
Obviously, the pHL2-onsequenes are the pHL1-onsequenes to whih
the preferenes are added where neessary.
4.1.2 Semantis of pHL2.
The semantis of pHL2 is obtained from the pHL1-semantis by replaing
N by n sets N
n
= f
n
A j A 2 Fg. In the denition of the assignment
funtion S1.4 is replaed by:
S1.4. v : N
n
! f0; 1g, for eah n  1.
The valuation funtion is dened by replaing in the pHL1-lauses S2.6
and S2.11  and 8 by 
n
and 8
n
for eah n  1.
4.1.3 Metatheory of pHL2.
If we take in aount the above mentioned dierenes between pHL1 and
pHL2, the metatheory of pHL2 is ompletely analogous to the metatheory
of pHL1.
4.2 HL2.
HL2 has three purposes. (i) Whenever 
n
:A is pHL2-derivable and :A
is not pHL2-derivable from  , then A is HL2-derivable from  . (ii) If both

n
:A and :A are pHL2-derivable, then :A is HL2-derivable, but A is
not. (iii) If both DEK() _A and DEK() _ :A are pHL2-derivable, then
the onditional preferenes of the fators of DEK() and DEK() deide
whether A or :A is nally derivable.
4.2.1 Proof Theory of HL2.
Let 9℄
n
A stand for 9(A& 
n
A). Let DEKfA
i
1
; :::; A
j
n
g refer to 9℄
i
A
i
_ ::: _
9℄
j
A
n
(i; j  1), a disjuntion of (where neessary) existentially quantied
ontraditions (onfer Setion 2.2.1). The format of HL2-proofs is the same
as for HL and HL1.
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Definition: The 
i
-onsistent behaviour of a formula B is a ondition of
preferene i i 
i
B is an instane of a exeptional UQF of preferene i. The
number i is the onditional preferene of B. (Notie that a higher number
orresponds to a lower onditional preferene.)
20
Definition: A is not reliable at a stage of a proof i it does not behave
onsistently at that stage of the proof or its onsistent behaviour is on-
neted to the onsistent behaviour of other formulas none of whih has a
lower onditional preferene than A.
Given theseHL2-denitions, the unonditional ruleRU, the onditional
ruleRC, and the marking ruleRM are ompletely analogous as forHL and
HL1. The following example illustrates the dierene between the ruleRM
in HL1 and HL2. Suppose lines (i)-(k) our in a proof:
21
(i) A x X B
[3℄
(j) :A y Y C
[2℄
(k) ℄
3
B _ ℄
2
C z Z -
If we drop the preferenes, both B and C would be unreliable, and hene
neither A nor :A would be nally derivable from these lines (this is the
situation in HL1). But in view of the fat that the onditional preferene
of C (2) is higher than the onditional preferene of B (3), C is reliable in
HL2 and hene :A is HL2-derivable from these lines.
Lemma 3 If in an HL2-proof from  , A ours as the seond element
and fC
1
; :::; C
m
g (0  m) as the fth element of a line, then   `
pHL2
A _ DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g.
22
The denition of \intelligent extension", \A is nally derived", \nal deriv-
ability", \onsequene set" and \minimal DEK-onsequene" remain the
same as for HL1 and HL. Also the derivation rule Dek is valid in HL2.
Theorem 13   `
HL2
A i there are C
1
; :::; C
m
(0  m) suh that   `
pHL2
A _ DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g, and none of C
1
; :::; C
m
is a fator of a minimal DEK-
onsequene of   unless some other fator of the minimal DEK-onsequene
has a lower onditional preferene than the onsidered C
i
.
Proof. For the rst diretion, let   `
HL2
A. Hene A is nally derived at
some line (j) of a proof from  . Let the fth element of this line be C
1
; :::; C
m
.
20
One and the same UQF never gets two dierent preferenes. Therefore we an aept
that every formula has (at maximum) one onditional preferene.
21
It is handy to indiate the onditional preferene of the formulas in the fth olumn
of a proof.
22
The proof of Lemma 3 is ompletely analogous to the proofs of Lemma 1 in [1℄ and
Lemma 4.2 in [4℄.
20
Hene   `
pHL2
A_DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g.   `
pHL2
A _ DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g (0 
m). Suppose now that C
i
is a fator of a minimal DEK-onsequene D of  
and there is no other fator of D with a lower onditional preferene than C;
then there is an extension of the proof in whih D ours unonditionally;
but then line (j) is marked by RM, whih ontradits the fat that A is
nally derived at line (j).
For the other diretion, suppose that there are C
1
; :::; C
m
(0  m) suh
that   `
pHL2
A _ DEKfC
1
; :::; C
m
g, and none of C
1
; :::; C
m
is a fator of a
minimal DEK-onsequene of   unless some other fator has a lower ondi-
tional preferene. Then there is a an HL2-proof from   in whih A ours
as the seond element of a line the fth element of whih is fC
1
; :::; C
m
g.
Moreover, every extension of the proof in whih line (j) would be marked
(beause some C
i
is not reliable, an be further extended in suh way that
C
i
beomes reliable again (in view of the supposition). It follows that A is
nally derived at that line. Whene   `
HL2
A. 2.
In HL and HL1 no fator of a minimal DEK-onsequene is reliable. In
HL2 however, those fators of a minimal DEK-onsequene are reliable the
onditional preferene of whih is higher than the onditional preferene of
some other fator of that minimal DEK-onsequene.
The marking rule mr1 of HL and HL1 is valid in HL2. I now give the
typial HL2-rule onerning marking of instanes.
Definition: If A ours as the seond element of a line of a proof, the line
preferene of A is the lowest onditional preferene (i.e. the highest number)
of the formulas in the fth element of that line. If the fth element is empty,
the line preferene of A is 0.
mr2: If the line preferene of A (resp. :A) is lower than the line
preferene of :A (resp. A) at any line of the proof, then
mark line (i).
Theorem 14 mr2 is a derivable rule of HL2.
Proof. Suppose  = fB
1
; :::; B
n
g (n  1), and  = fC
1
; :::; C
m
g (m  1),
and there is a B 2  suh that the onditional preferene of B is lower
than the onditional preferene of any C 2 . Suppose A ours as the
seond element of a line the fth element of whih is , and :A ours as
the seond element of a line the fth element of whih is . In view of
Lemma 3, both A _ DEK() and :A _ DEK() are pHL2-derivable from
the premises. Hene also DEK( [ ) is derivable from the premises. In
view of the supposition and the denition B is not reliable at that stage of
the proof. Hene the line in whih A was derived has to be marked in view
21
of RM. The proof is ompletely analogous if A is replaed by :A and vie
versa. 2.
Here is an example of a HL2-proof that illustrates the mehanism:
(1) (8
3
x)(Bx  Fx) - prem -
(2) (8
2
x)(Px  :Fx) - prem -
(3) (8
1
x)(Mx  Fx) - prem -
(4) (8
0
x)(Mx  Px) - prem -
(5) (8
0
x)(Px  Bx) - prem -
(6) Bb - prem -
(7) Pa - prem -
(8) 
3
:(Ba  Fa) 1 ui
3
-
(9) Ba  Fa 8 dn :(Ba  Fa)
[3℄
(10) 
3
:(Bb  Fb) 1 ui
3
-
(11) Bb  Fb 10 dn :(Bb  Fb)
[3℄
(12) 
2
:(Pa  :Fa) 2 ui
2
-
(13) Pa  :Fa 12 dn :(Pa  :Fa)
[2℄
(14) Pa  Ba 5 ui
0
-
(15) Fb 6, 11 mp :(Bb  Fb)
[3℄
(16) Ba 7, 14 mp -
y(17) Fa 16, 9 mp :(Ba  Fa)
[3℄
(18) :Fa 7, 13 mp :(Pa  :Fa)
[2℄
Fb at line (15) is nally derived. Line (17) is marked in view of mr2
and line (18). :Fa at line (18) is nally derived. If we ontinue the proof,
we an derive ℄
3
:(Ba  Fa) with :(Pa  :Fa)
[2℄
as fth element; hene
in view of RM line (9) has to be marked. The reader an verify that from
these premises (8
0
x)(℄
1
:(Mx  Fx) _ ℄
2
(Px  :Fx) _ :Mx) is derivable,
and hene also :Ma and :Mb, whereas F is derivable when we add the
premise M.
4.3 Semantis of HL2.
The HL2-semantis is obtained from the pHL2-semantis by dening, for
eah  , a subset of the pHL2-models of  . Any   denes a set of seman-
tially unreliable formulas. The HL2-models of   are those pHL2-models
of   in whih only unreliable formulas behave inonsistently. The set of un-
reliable formulas with respet to   is a subset of the fators of the minimal
DEK-onsequenes of  .
Definition: If   j=
pHL2

n
B (whereas   6j=
pHL2

m
B (1  m < n)), then
22
CP
 
(B) = n. If  = fB
1
; :::; B
n
g (n  1), then CP
 
() is the maximum of
CP
 
(B
1
):::;CP
 
(B
n
).
Definition: IfB 2 ,  is a minimalDEK-onsequene of  , and CP
 
(B) =
CP
 
(), then B is HL2-unreliable with respet to  . U( ) is the set of all
ws that are HL2-unreliable with respet to  .
Definition: Where M is a pHL2-model, ab(M) = fA j v
M
(℄A) = 1g.
Definition: M is a HL2-model of   i it is a pHL2-model of   and
ab(M)  U( ).
Definition:   j=
HL2
A i A is true in all HL2-models of  .
4.4 Metatheory of HL2.
The Soundness and Strong Completeness Theorems of HL2 are analogous
to those of HL1.
4.5 Conluding Remarks.
(i) HL2 is a logi in whih most wanted onsequenes are nally deriv-
able from a set of premises some of whih are UQFs with (preditable or
unpreditable) exeptions, whereas most unwanted are not.
23
Of the two
halves of an inonsisteny, the one derived from the least preferred infor-
mation is not nally derivable. The power of HL2 lies in its strategy. In
omparison to Consisteny-Based Logis, suh as Default Logi, that try to
resolve these kinds of inonsistenies by antiipating the exeptions (in a
default),
24
HL2 allows for 
n
-inonsistenies and onditionally derived :-
inonsistenies within the proess (i.e. within theHL2-proofs), and resolves
the :-inonsistenies when they our. In my opnion, the most interesting
property of HL2 is that exeptions need not te be known beforehand. Its
dynami proof proedure allows for the introdution of new premises at any
23
From the premises fTweety is a penguin, birds y, penguins do not y, and penguins
are birdsg, HL2 derives that Tweety ies, and all other individuals in the domain do not
y. This is a result that is worth being ompared with the results of Cirumsription
(Parallel Prediate Cirumsription, Abnormality Theories, Prioritized Cirumsription
(onfer the proof in Setion 4.2.1); see, e.g., [5℄ pp. 12-21. HL2 however, is not able to
onlude from \All sailors are male and have a beard" and \Sailor Popeye has no beard",
that \Popeye is a man". In suh ases, the easiest solution is to write two UQFs instead of
one UQF ontaining a onjuntion. (For instane: \All sailors are male" and \All sailors
have a beard".)
24
See, e.g., [5℄ pp. 39-64. Note that HL2 derives that Paul likes wine, from fPaul is
Italian or Frenh, Italians like wine, Frenh like wineg. Also HL2 does not derive that
one has a usable left and a usable right arm when one has a broken left or broken right
arm.
23
stage of the proof, whereas the introdution of new premises possibily leads
to a dierent onsequene set.
(ii) It is easily seen that (a) is a pHL2-theorem:
(a) (8
n
)A  (8)(℄
n
:A _A)
It is indeed possible to write every exeptional UQF as a lassial UQF. In
view of this theorem, it an easily be proven that pHL2 (and hene also
HL2) has an interesting transitivity rule:
(8
n
)(A()  B())
(8
m
)(B()  C())
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||-
pHL2
(8)(℄
n
:(A()  B()) _ ℄
m
:(B()  C()) _ (A()  C()))
This property of pHL2 an be very useful in the reonstrution of other
non-monotoni systems.
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I hope to establish this in forthoming papers.
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